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Abstract-The development of information technology 
has eased the medical services and provided the 
electronic health service in a way that a doctor can 
keep the records of patients in an information 
system and be informed of changes of status of 
patients, and make decisions promptly. However, 
there are increasing challenges over the privacy of 
patients due to the exposition of clinic information 
patients to ubiquitous networks.  This paper 
introduces a framework for authentication and 
authorization in e-health services. It aims to build 
the architecture for authentication and 
authorisation within an e-health service system. The 
architecture will help to build a secure and privacy-
protection e-health service system.  The authors 
hope that understanding the underlying framework 
will not only inform researchers of a better design 
for e-health service, but also assist e-health systems 
developers in the understanding of intricate 
constructions within authentication and 
authorisation. Further, our paper highlights the 
importance of protecting the privacy of medical 




1.1   Background and Related Works 
Web services are essential in enabling healthcare 
administrative members, medical   professionals and patients to 
organise, share and access to the medical services. Due to the 
development of web technologies, security and privacy issues 
are rising over traditional medical services (Smith et al., 1999; 
Agrawal et al., 2004).   These requirements can be met by 
promoting health-care security issues over web services. Web 
services should be used in such a way that timely and not too 
cumbersome access to health-care records be provided without 
compromising patients’ privacy.  
 The purpose of an e-health service system is to take care of the 
patients. The most important asset of an e-health service 
system is the patient as well as the intelligence knowledge 
created by the related GP, specialist, or therapist. In addition to 
the need to  
Figure 1. Changes of Security and Privacy for health service 
 
protect the privacy of the patient is the sharing of patient data 
in order to ensure the availability of accurate and timely 
information to all authorised communicating partners. Security 
controls must thus be evaluated in terms of its functional 
benefits for protecting the privacy of the patient, whilst at the 
same time providing timely accurate information to service 
providers and physicians. As a result, governments, 
administrative bodies and the different players in the health 
service system are looking for innovative solutions to make 
health services more efficient and secure.  
Data privacy is a growing concern among health care sector, 
which are entrusted with the responsibility of managing patient 
information. Access control mechanisms are essential in 
protecting sensitive patient information. These mechanisms 
should provide for simultaneous access to different patient 
data, for example, health history, patient-case data, 
administrative data and the like. In addition, patients require 
access to various hospital services and features that will 
enhance their comfort and safety. Access control includes two 
primary aspects, namely to deny access to health-care data to 
those users who do not have the right of access and, secondly, 
they need to guarantee access to all relevant data to those 
database users who exercise their access privilege properly.  
Authorisation is effected according to the access rights 
specified for each user role. All access-controls may, however, 
be overridden by specially authorised clinicians using the 
emergency functions. The principal aim is to develop and 
implement need-to-know access-controls that would protect 
patients’ medical health data.  
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In terms of these controls, the user would only be allowed to 
access information necessary to complete his or her job. A 
secretary would, therefore, be unable to access a patient’s 
clinical data, whilst a doctor would be. On the other hand, in 
health-care information systems, it may be necessary to realise 
two or more databases in one system. For example, if a doctor 
wanted to hide the real name of a possible disease from a 
patient in a critical condition until such time as the diagnosis 
has been confirmed by laboratory tests, the database viewed by 
the patient should be different from the one used by the doctor. 
Situations like these need to be controlled, 
In an emergency situation, a doctor may need to access 
information on a patient as soon as possible. This doctor 
should be first authorised but not authenticated since she/he is 
an on-duty doctor. Therefore, in order to save time, react 
efficiently and save life of the underlying patient, it is essential 
to propose and develop a framework for authorisation and 
authentication architecture for e-health service system.  
Smith et al. (1999) discussed the trends on security issues with 
respect to health care information systems.  They reviewed the 
protection of electronic patient records, health care information 
over the Internet, the application of patient smart cards, the 
need-to-know access control in protecting sensitive patient 
information and the database security policies for medical 
databases. They also reviewed the legal issues related to 
information technology in the health care sector. In addition, 
they discussed a number of possible research areas for health 
care information systems. They pointed out that access control 
mechanisms that can be effectively control access to patient 
data in health care systems should be further investigated. 
Blobel et al. (2006) focused on the application security 
challenges and proposed an architectural approach of security. 
They developed a series of formal models of domains, service 
delegation, claims control, policies, roles, authorisations, and 
access control for health information system. Their approach 
allow for the central management of the users, privileges, rules, 
policies and separation of security management and secure 
application functions. It enables scalability of both security 
services and mechanisms on one hand and applications on the 
other. 
Lopez et al. (2005) stated that most of authentication and 
authorisation services focus on either authentication or 
authorisation, and are not complete. It is necessary to extend 
the scope of security solutions by providing an integrated 
authentication-and-authorisation service for communicating 
peers.  The disadvantage of their methodology is authentication 
and authorisation are integrated into one single function 
process. However, that is not practical for some real-world 
applications, for example, e-health service system, where 
authorisation and authentication should be set up in a scenario: 
there is an e-health service system (EHSS), in which there are a 
GP, a Specialist, a Dentist, a Therapist, a Chemist, and a 
Nurse. All these entities are registered users of the EHSS. 
Then, by the authorisation policy, they will be authorised to 
enter into the authentication level if they show their passes. 
Because they have different roles, they will be assigned 
different Read/Write capabilities once they are authenticated 
and identified by the authentication mechanism. 
     Li et al. (2005) studied the problem of patient privacy 
protection related to medical images. They tried to make an 
effort towards protecting against unauthorised release of 
images by an authorised recipient. They proposed a fingerprint 
model suitable for many-to-many multicast, that is 
computationally efficient and scalable in user storage and key 
update communication. 
      Lopez et al. (2004) surveyed and discussed Microsoft .NET 
and some related activities (e.g. the Liberty Alliance project), 
Kerberos-based solutions, digital certificated and public key 
infrastructures that all can be used to build and operate 
authentication or authorisation infrastructure.  One of their 
observations is that there is no single best approach for 
providing an authentication and authorisation infrastructure.  
Lopez et al. (2004) stated that “… to the observation that e-
commerce requires an authentication service only in the 
foreground, and that an authorization service is very important 
from a commercial and practical point of view. In this sense, 
an authentication delivers proof that the identity of an object or 
subject has indeed the identity it claims to have, while the 
authorization one means the granting of permission on the 
basis of authenticated identification.  ” 
     The above observation implied that authorization is based 
on the result of authentication. If the result of authentication is 
negative/positive, then the result of authorization is 
negative/positive. In other words, if the authentication for an 
entity is not successful, then the authorization for the 
underlying entity will not be granted. However, that 
principle/observation is not practical to an e-health 
environment. Why? This is because in e-health environment, 
each entity (e.g. a GP, a Specialist, …. , a Patient, a Nurse) has 
a pseudo identification number (e.g. a staff number or a patient 
number). Whoever holding this kind of number should be 
authorized to enter into the e-health system. However, that 
does not mean they can access to every subarea of the 
underlying e-health system. At this point, role-based 
authentication will be activated if the underlying entity (e.g. a 
GP, a Specialist, …. , a Patient, a Nurse) wants to access to 
some specific subarea (e.g. a subarea where a doctor can 
provide health service to some patients suffering from 
insomnia) of the e-health system. 
      In this article, we will focus on the design of a practical 
architecture for authentication and authorization within an e-
health environment. So far no research focus on authorization 
and authentication has addressed a practical solution to this 
issue within an e-health environment. 
1.2   Motivation of Proposing a Framework for 
Authentication and Authorisation for e-Health Services 
The aim of our article is to develop a framework for 
authorization and authentication for identity management 
within an e-health service system that are critical for the 
success, security and privacy of the underlying system both 
from a strategic and information technology perspective.  
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       Most of the existing research proposals that study 
authorization and authentication have separated the function of 
authorization and authentication in terms of access control and 
identity management, for example, . Microsoft .NET  passport 
(Oppliger, 2003) utilized the authentication approach as the 
main access control principle; while, the others, e.g. Zhang et 
al. (2003)  studied authorization approach as the main access 
control principle. In other words, some of the existing works 
focus on the role-based authentication and authorization 
[Sandh et al. 1996]; while others focus on attribute-certificate 
based authentication and authorization, e.g. authentication and 
authorization infrastructure (AAI) or privilege management 
infrastructure (PMI)  (Farrell et al. 2002; Schlaeger and Pernul, 
2005; Lopez et al. 2005; Blobel et al. 2006) 
       The disadvantage of those studies is that: (1) they did not 
consider the mutual and sequential impact of authorization and 
authentication in terms of access control and identity 
management. (2) They lack of the analysis of the relationship 
between authorization and authentication from e-health service 
perspective. Therefore, it is essential to further investigate the 
relationship between authorization and authentication over 
access control and identity management, especially from an e-
health service system perspective. More importantly, this will 
be beneficial to the protection of the corresponding patients’ 
information and clinic records within the underlying e-health 
service system.  This is because: (1) we simultaneously utilize 
the authorization principle and authentication principle within 
the access control of the underlying e-health service system; 
(2) we then sequentially cooperate/place the function position 
of authorization and authentication in a way that the 
authorization principle acts as the outspace pass as well as 
innerspace pass to the e-health service system, while the 
authentication principle acts as the innerspace pass to the 
underlying e-health service system.    
 
 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORISATION 
FOR E-HEALTH SERVICES 
An electronic health service system, is a collection of 
components working together to implement the e-health 
services. Because data is processed into practical information 
by the information system, authentication and authorisation 
become one of the essential concerns of the e-health service 
systems. This means that the system should protect data and 
the information produced from the data from having its 
confidentiality, integrity and availability violated on any layer. 
       The proposed architecture for authorisation and 
authentication for e-Health services system is a practical and 
new solution for access control within e-health service systems 
since presently there is no such solution that focuses on the 
authorisation and authentication simultaneously and 
sequentially for the access control within e-health service 
system as one of the applications in real-world scenario.  
       The architecture will help to build a secure and privacy-
protection e-health service system.         Physicians 
participating in a secure e-health service system can benefit 
from a mix of cooperative resource sharing strategies and 
cooperative profit sharing strategies.  
 
 
III. AUTHORISATION AND AUTHENTICATION ARCHITECTURE 
FOR E-HEALTH SERVICES 
The proposed authorisation and authentication architecture for 
e-health services (A3AeHS) system will integrate the role-
based method (Hitchens et al. 2000) and the attribute certificate 
(or privilege) based method (Blobel et al. 2006) into the 
electronic health service system. 
3.1   Authorisation Implication 
 Authorisation is the policy-driven limitation of access to e-
health service systems and the related data.  
1. The first step in creating an authorisation policy is to 
enumerate all of the underlying e-health service 
system. For example, given an electronic health 
record of a patient who is registered with the e-health 
service system, we should enumerate what is history 
health record (e.g. for reference purpose), what is 
current general health record (e.g. for physiotherapy 
purpose), and what is critical health record (e.g. for 
saving life purpose). 
2. The second step in creating an authorisation policy is 
to determine how sensitive each record is for the 
underlying e-health service system (especially for 
patients). 
3. The third step in creating an authorisation policy is to 
determine who should access to each record. For 
example, a GP can access to all the records of an 
patient, while a Specialist can only access to a specific 
record.   
4. The fourth step in creating an authorisation policy is 
to determine the specific authorisation that a role 
should have for the record. This step is to assign 
different privileges to different roles in an e-health 
service system. 
5. By the step 3 and 4, we will integrate the role-based 
and privilege-based policies into the authorisation 
policy for the underlying e-health service system. 
Thus, we create the Role-and-privilege-based 
authorisation policy. That can assign the different 
levels of privileges by the different roles. This is 
critical for an e-health service system.  
3.2   Authentication Implication 
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of a role 
in an e-health service system.  In our framework, the two-
factor authentication mechanism will be integrated into the 
authorisation and authentication architecture for e-health 
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service system (A3AeHS). In the two-factor authentication 
mechanism, each role of the underlying e-health service system 
is required to use a biometric authentication (Fingerprints, 
2005) together with a digital PIN authentication.  If and only if 
the two-factor authentication is successful, the authorisation 
policy mechanism will be activated and the authorisation right 
will be granted to the underlying individual. 
3.3 Architecture of Authorisation and Authentication within 
e-Health Service System 
The architecture for authorisation and authentication within e-
health service system should address the topology of 
authorisation and authentication and the grading of 
authorisation and authentication.  
The topology of authorisation and authentication can classify 
the architecture of authorisation and authentication within e-
health service system in a security overview. 
The following figure shows the topology of the authentication 
and authorisation for e-health service system. 
 
Fig 3. Grading of  Authorisation and Authentication for e-




       The proposed grading of authorisation and authentication 
is displayed in the following figure Fig 3.  
     The grading of authorisation and authentication can rank the 
level of authorisation and authentication within an e-health 
service system. This will clarify that the different fundamental 
function of authorisation and authentication on the security and 
privacy for e-health service systems.  
3.4   Authorisation and Authentication Procedure within e-
Health Service System 
Consider there are Dentist, GP, Specialist, Nurse, Chemist and 
a number of patients,  who will first register with an e-health 
service system. Suppose the GP wants to access an electronic 
health record within the e-health service system.  
 
(1) The users first register at the administrator with the e-
health service system will send an access request by 
the access request agent.  
(2) If needing service from the system, the user, for 
example, one GP, generates an access request. 
(3) The access request agent then sends the access request 
token to the administrative agent.  
(4) The administrative agent then refers to the 
authorisation policy of the system and then sends the 
preliminary authorisation reference for the GP. 
(5)  The GP will be authenticated based on the biometric 
information and the digital PIN. If the authentication is 
successful, the GP will be granted a formal 
authorisation reference.  
(6)  By the formal authorisation reference, the GP will be 
verified whether he has the privilege of reading/writing 
into the e-health service system. 
(7) By the role-and-privilege based authorisation policy, if 
the GP’s status satisfies the requirements of the policy,  
the identity of the GP will be send to will be sent to 
Authentication agent. 
(8) If the identity of the GP is correctly identified, he will 
granted to access to the targeted patient electronic 
health record. 
The following figure displays the procedures for authorization 
and authentication within the e-health service system. 
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A person who is properly 
authenticated can enter into the 
authentication level 
A person who is 
properly authorised 
can access the e-
health service system 
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     This architecture can better guarantee the confidentiality of 
the underlying e-health service system. This is because the 
proposed architecture utilised both authorisation and 
authentication that initial the access control over the underlying 
e-health service system. 
 











































 This architecture can maximize the possibility of fitting the 
real-world applications.  Specially, this is suitable to the e-
health service system, where the authorisation should be first 
initialled, and the two-factor authentication, and then followed 
by the role-and-privilege based authorisation. This will help 
different roles with access to different levels of the underlying 
e-health service system. 
       This architecture can better preserve the privacy of the 
underlying patients’ information and clinical records within the 
e-health service system, as well as protect the intelligence 
copyright of the underlying GP, specialist, dentist or therapist 
who has contributed to the treatment of the corresponding 
patients.  This is because the integrated authorisation 






This paper presented a framework for authentication and 
authorisation for e-health services system.  The framework 
provides the architecture for authentication and authorisation. 
The proposed architecture integrated the role-based access 
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control and the privilege-based access control into the 
authorisation and authentication services. This will better suit 
to the e-health service system in terms of identity management.  
The authors hope that the proposed framework would help the 
developing and administration of e-health service systems in a 
secure, efficient and flexible way. In the next step of this 
research, we will design and implement the authorisation 
policy and the role-and-privilege based authentication for e-
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